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ESSAY
Crimes and Defenses
of Rodion Raskolnikov
BY VERA BERGELSON*
INTRODUCTION
n early July of 1865 m St. Petersburg, Rodion Raskolnikov killed
two women, the old moneylender Alyona Ivanovna and her sister
Lizaveta, and took money and valuables from their apartment. Twelve
days later, he turned himself in and made a complete confession to the
police. Several months after that, he went on trial.
His trial went off without any great difficulties. To the final
questions - what could have made him commit the murder and what
had induced him to commit the act of robbery - he answered very
plainly and with most offensive accuracy that the cause of it all was his
wretched material position, is poverty and helplessness He had
made up his mind to commit the murder, however, chiefly because of
his reckless and cowardly character, exasperated, moreover, by his
privations and failures.'
Raskolnikov was found guilty and sentenced to penal servitude for
the term of eight years.
* Associate at Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton in New York. J.D.,
University of Pennsylvania; Ph.D., Institute of Slavic and Balkan Studies at the
Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Umon; University Diploma, Moscow State
University. Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Professor Leo Katz for his
inspiration and support throughout the writing process. I owe special thanks to
Andrei Korovikov and Anna Gelpem who were generous with their time,
comments, and support.
I FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 543-44 (David
Magarshack trans., 1977) (1866).
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This ordinary criminal case forms the plot 2 of Fyodor Dostoevsky's
Crime and Punishment (1865). One of the classics of world literature,3
this artistic study in the philosophy and psychology of crime continues to
tantalize readers with eternal questions of human existence, and continues
to attract a wide range of literary and interdisciplinary scholars to
different aspects of Dostoevsky's work.4
Crime and Punishment presents a fascinating challenge to a scholar
of law and literature interested in applying familiar legal concepts to
well-known works of literature with a hope to enhance the understanding
2 A brief description of the plot of the novel is probably provided best by
Dostoevsky himself in his 1865 letter to Katkov, his prospective publisher:
This is a psychological account of a crime. A young man of
middle-class origin, sent down from university, living in abject poverty,
and given to unstable notions, has been entertaining some rather strange
"incomplete" ideas which were floating in the air at the time. He
decides to get himself out of hs unhappy situation by killing a certain
old money-lender. She is a stupid, deaf, sick and greedy old woman
who charges exorbitant rates of interest, is evil and causes other misery
[.] He decides to kill and rob her in order to help his mother in her
financial difficulties, free his sister from her degrading position, go
back to university and finish his degree and then spend the rest of
hIs life as an upright man of unswerving duty carrying out his humane
debt to society, which of course will wipe out hs crime. [T]his
young man manages to carry out his idea quickly and successful-
ly No one suspects him, but this is when the whole psychological
process of the cnme begins to unfold. The criminal decides to
undergo pumshment to atone for his crime.
Quoted in MARIA KRAVCHENKO, DOSTOEVSKY AND THE PSYCHOLOGISTS 113-14
(1978). Note that this letter describes a draft of the novel; m a later draft,
Raskolnikov's motivations became much more psychologically and philo-
sophically complex. Id. at 114-15; see also JOHN JONES, DOSTOEVSKY 202-03
(1986).
3 G. Fridlender, F.M. Dostoevsky i ego nasledie, in 1 F.M. DOSTOEVSKY
19 (1982).
4 See, e.g.,NIKOLAI BERDIAEV, MIROSOZERTSANIE DOSTOEVSKOGO (1957)
(a study of Dostoevsky's philosophy by a famous Russian religious philosopher);
Louis BREGER, DOSTOEVSKy- THE AUTHOR AS PSYCHOANALYST (1989) (a study
of Dostoevsky's works from the point of view of psychoanalysis); ROBERT Louis
JACKSON, DOSTOEVSKY'S QUEST FOR FORM (1978) (a study of Dostoevsky's
philosophy of art); Paul Squires, Dostoevsky'sDoctrne of Crminal Responsibili-
ty, 27 J. C~iM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 817 (1937) (a study in the psychology of
crime, calling Crime and Punishment "a great cornerstone of modem cnmmolo-
gy").
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of both.5 In this novel, Dostoevsky focused primarily on moral and
psychological aspects of the crime providing only a sketchy description
of Raskolnikov's trial, almost entirely leaving out possible legal
arguments. Such brevity invites readers to judge Raskolnikov based on
their own ideas of justice, assuring their complicity in the moral task of
the novel. In contemporary American jurisprudence, a natural source of
such ideas would be the Model Penal Code - the most systematic and
widely adopted theory of criminal justice.6
This Essay is an attempt to read Crime and Punishment and the
Model Penal Code together, conducting a hypothetical "retrial" of Rodion
Raskolnikov under the legal and moral principles reflected in the Model
Penal Code. Treating the text of the novel as evidence and including
"witness testimoies" of numerous literary experts, this Essay tries to take
advantage of opportunities which the court in Crime and Punishment
could not have had - a complete story of the crime and access to the true
motives of the defendant. At the same time, the Model Penal Code is
tested against the complex psychological account of a crime depicted in
Crime and Punishment.
The Model Penal Code requires that a number of conditions be met
before a person can be convicted of a crime. The prosecution must prove
its case-in-chief, consisting of an actus reus (a voluntary act) and a mens
rea (a culpable state of mind), and must overcome any possible defenses.
This Essay examines whether Raskolnikov can avoid punishment by
defeating the case-m-cluef or successfully asserting an affirmative
defense. It seeks out possible legal avenues of escape for Raskolnikov,
tests them against the applicable provisions of the Model Penal Code, and
finds them wanting.
' For theoretical scholarship on law and literature, see, for example, THE
HAPPY COUPLE: LAW AND LITERATURE (J Neville Turner & Pamela Williams
eds., 1994) (discussing law and literature as an academic field); RICHARD A.
POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988) (noting
that "[t]he study of law and literature seeks to use legal insights to enhance
understanding of literature, not just literary insights to enhance understanding of
law," id. at 1); IAN WARD, LAW AND LITERATURE: POSSIBILITIES AND
PERSPECTIVES (1995); RICHARD H. WEISBERG, POETHICS, AND OTHER STRATE-
GIES OF LAW AND LITERATURE (1992) (discussing two interrelated aspects of law
and literature: literary values of legal writings, and treatment of lawyers,' law,
and justice in fiction).
6 See, e.g., Paul Marcus, The Model Penal Code and Commentanes, 73 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 811 (1982) (book review discussing the remarkable
impact of the Model Penal Code on Amencanjunsprudence).
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The Essay consists of four parts: the first three explore various
elements of Raskolnikov's crimes and the fourth focuses on his punish-
ment. Part I, devoted to the actus reus requirement, discusses whether
Raskolnikov's acts were, in fact, voluntary 7 Part HI examines
Raskolnikov's mens rea and determines what crimes he should be charged
with under the Model Penal Code.' Part HI reviews justification and
excuse defenses which might be invoked in Raskolnikov's case.9 Part IV
discusses the sentence handed down to Raskolnikov by the court in the
novel and compares it with the sentence he would have received under
the Model Penal Code sentencing guidelines.'0
I. VOLUNTARY ACr REQUiRENMENT:
WAS RASKOLNIKOV'S CoNDucr CRIMINAL?
A person cannot be found guilty under the Model Penal Code unless
he or she has acted with a culpable state of mind" and voluntarily
committed an unlawful act."2 The first step in building a case against
Raskolnikov, therefore, is to establish actus reus - to show that he was
acting voluntarily when he killed Alyona Ivanovna and Lizaveta and stole
the former's money and jewelry At first glance, the need to prove
something that obvious strikes one as ridiculous: Raskolnikov had been
planning the murder and robbery for several weeks. Two days before the
crime, he conducted a "rehearsal." An hour before the murder he stole a
hatchet, sewed a sling on the lining of his overcoat to hide the weapon,
and prepared a fake pledge.
However, were Raskolnikov's acts truly voluntary9 The Model Penal
Code defines a voluntary act as "a willed muscular contraction or bodily
movement by the actor."' 3 The comment to section 2.01 explains that
the "term 'voluntary' does not inject into the criminal law questions
about determinism and free will. Rather, it focuses upon conduct that is
withun the control of the actor."' 4 Specifically excluded from the scope
of voluntary acts is "conduct during hypnosis or resulting from hypnotic
7 See mfra notes 11-30 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 31-78 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 79-154 and accompanying text.
'o See infra notes 155-77 and accompanying text.
" Defined as "purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently." MODEL
PENAL CODE. OFFICIAL DRAFr AND EXPLANATORY NOTES § 2.02 (1985).
12 Id. § 2.01.
13 Id. § 1.13(2).
'4 Id., Comment to § 2.01 at 215 (emphasis added).
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suggestion."'s There is nothing in the wording of or in the comment to
this provision that restricts it to hypnotic suggestion by somebody other
than the actor. If read literally, it may well apply to situations in which
a person acts under his own hypnotic suggestion.
With this in mind, let us take a closer look at Raskolnikov's crimes
- his will does not appear to control his actions.' 6 He talks and acts like
an automaton. The day before the murder, when Raskolnikov learned that
the old moneylender would be entirely alone at home the next evening,
he felt "like a man sentenced to death. He thought of nothing, and indeed
he was quite incapable of thinking; but he suddenly felt with all his being
that he no longer possessed any freedom of reasoning or of will, and that
everything was suddenly and irrevocably settled."' 7
On the day of the actual murder Raskolnikov felt:
almost an automatic influence upon hun: it was as though someone had
taken him by the hand and drawn him after himself, blindly, irresistibly,
with supernatural force, and without any objections on his part. As
though he had been caught m the cog of a wheel by the hem of his coat
and was being drawn into it.'"
A literary scholar, Anthony D. Nuttal, offers an appealing explana-
tion for Raskolnikov's condition - self-hypnosis and post-hypnotic
suggestion.' 9 In a paradigmatic case of hypnosis, a hypnotist implants a
suggestion in the subject's mind to be activated later by a specific trigger.
Once activated, the suggestion forces the subject to perform certain acts
without the subject fully realizing why he or she is powerless to avoid the
task.20
'- Id. § 2.01(2)(c) (emphasis added).
16 See DR. E.A.D.R. CARP, RODION RASKOLNIKOV (A PSYCHOPATHOLOGI-
CAL STUDY) (I. van den Bosch trans.), cited in KRAVCHENKO, supra note 2, at
115-16 ("As soon as he learns that his victim will be alone at a certain time,
Raskolnikov becomes powerless to change his fate and all delusions of self-
glorification and absolute authority disappear. Raskolnikov becomes a helpless
being who commits the crime m a dream-like state and later retains only a
dream-like memory of it."); see also ANTHONY DAVID NUTTAL, CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT: MURDER AS PHILOSOPHIC EXPERIMENT 91-93 (1978).
17 DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 81.
18 Id. at 90.
'9 See NUTTAL, supra note 16, at 91-93.
20 For descriptions of hypnotic states, see, for example, Margaret Brenman,
The Phenomena ofHypnosts, in PROBLEMS OF CONSCIOUSNESS: TRANSACTIONS
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
No evil hypnotist exists in Crime and Punishment, but many signs
point to Raskolnikov hypnotizing or almost hypnotizing himself. He
induces m himself a trance-like state by months of self-isolation, dwelling
on the hopelessness of his situation, and, most importantly, by constant
and obsessive repetition of key ideas: "'extraordinary' man," "Napo-
leon,"'. "everythng is permitted." And into this trance he thrusts a sharp
and forceful command: "Dare!" which could not but have found root in
his weakened and susceptible psyche.
The suggestion thus planted needed a signal to be activated, and this
signal came. In a little tavern where Raskolnikov stopped for a cup of
tea, he overheard a conversation about the justification of murder -
specifically, the murder of Alyona Ivanovna, with whom he had just
pawned his sister's nng! A student declared:
"Kill her, take her money, and with its help devote yourself to the
service of humanity and the good of all. And, when you come to
think of it, what does the life of a sickly, wicked old hag amount to
when weighed in the scales of the general good of manknd? It amounts
to no more than the life of a louse or a black beetle, if that, for the old
hag is really harmful."22
This coincidentally overheard conversation23 was a shock to
Raskolnikov A connection suddenly appeared between the ideas he
repeated to himself in his trance, and the real world: another person
proclaimed almost exactly what he has been telling himself for months.
"Tins idle talk at a restaurant was to exert a great influence on hin"
It was as though there had really been something preordained here, a kind
of a sign."'24
OF THE FIRST CONFERENCE 123 (Harold A. Abramson ed., 1951); Lewis R.
Wolberg, Hypnotic Phenomena, in PROBLEMS OF CONsCIOuSNESS: TRANSAC-
TIONS OF THE THIRD CONFERENCE 76 (Harold A. Abramson ed., 1952); William
P Swam, Note, Hypnotism and the Law, 14 VAND. L. REV 1509 (1961).
21 See NUTrAL, supra note 16, at 44 (noting that of names of the great men
of the past "the one that persistently recurs to Raskolnikov is Napoleon's, and
that about Napoleon which strikes him most forcibly is that he 'forgets an army
in Egypt"').
22 DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 84-85.
23 Dostoevsky has been criticized for heavy reliance on accidentally
overheard conversations, but as one writer notes correctly, the coincidence here
is quite intentional, feeding into Raskolnikov's sense of determimsm. See GARY
COX, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: A MIND TO MURDER 46 (1990).
24 DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 85.
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Now that a channel had opened between Raskolnikov's private
dream-world and real life, he found himself starting to act. In his actions,
however, he resembled a pre-programmed robot much more than a man
controlling Ins conduct. As one scholar of Dostoevsky astutely noted, the
sense of determimsm is carried into the murder scene through a whole
series of images and grammatical constructions wich suggest that
Raskolnikov was acting passively, mechamcally, without engagement of
his will.25
Raskolnikov's state of mind indeed reminds one of a hypnotized
person. But is his condition pronounced enough to cast doubt on the
existence of an actus reus m his deeds? There are several reasons against
finding is actions involuntary within the meaning of the Model Penal
Code.
First of all, Raskolnikov's is a case of self-hypnosis. In Crime and
Punishment, unlike m the paradigmatic case where the hypnotized
commits a crime following the will of another, Raskolnikov killed
following his own will. Even if we somewhat artificially distinguish
Raskolnikov-hypnotist and Raskolnikov-hypnotized, Raskolnikov-the-
whole-person would still be guilty as someone who both acted and
exercised control over the actor's bodily movements.
Another reason to consider Raskolnikov's killing and robbery
voluntary is the sense we get that although Ins behavior looked compul-
sive, he was still not completely "programmed." Up to the very last
moment, Raskolnikov could have abandoned his plan had he wanted to,
yet he did not want to stop. Witness his outrage and disappointment when
he could not obtain the hatchet:
He was crushed, even somehow humiliated. He felt like laughing at
himself with rage. He was boiling over with blind, brutish anger.
He did not feel like walking along the street and pretending to go for
a stroll; and he felt even less like going back to his room. "And what
a chance I have missed for good! '26
Even after the first homicide, Raskolnikov could have stopped and
avoided the second killing, for Lizaveta's murder was not planned at all,
and he could hardly have "programmed" himself for it. When she
unexpectedly came home he did not paic. Quickly evaluating the
situation and making a fast decision, Raskolnikov hid in Alyona
25 See Cox, supra note 23, at 46-47
26 DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 91.
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Ivanovna's bedroom, "waited, hardly daring to breathe; but suddenly he
jumped to his feet, snatched up the hatchet and rushed out of the
bedroom.""
More elements of conscious decision-making can be seen in the
description of Raskolnikov searching for the slaughtered woman's money
He had to consider where it might be hidden, try keys, and, in other
words, make rational decisions.
Suddenly he remembered the big key with the notches in the bit which
was hanging there with the other small keys, and he realized that it
could not possibly belong to the chest of drawers but to some trunk
or box, and that it was there that everything had most likely been
hidden away."
This kind of rational reasomng and acting evidences that although
Raskolnikov's thinking might have been blurred, he did not completely
lose the ability to control his conduct.
Finally, when distinguishing between a voluntary and involuntary act,
the Model Penal Code looks not only at the "snapshot" state of the actor,
but rather puts the act in. question into a continuum of events and
conditions that preceded it. The Explanatory Note to section 2.01 stresses
that "[ilt is required only that the actor's conduct include a voluntary
act, and thus unconsciousness preceded by voluntary action may lead to
liability based upon the earlier conduct."29 It may be true that
Raskolnikov was not acting voluntarily at all tunes, but his conduct at
least included voluntary elements during various stages when he
contemplated and prepared the cnme.
For these reasons, the self-hypnosis hypothesis, although appealing
on first glance, cannot form the basis of Raskolnikov's defense. Still, the
evidence presented here could be used as part of an insanity defense and
this possibility is discussed later in the Essay 30
27 Id. at 98.
28 Id.
29 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 11, Explanatory Note to § 2.01, at 213
(citing a paradigmatic situation in which an epileptic driver who killed a
pedestrian while in an epileptic seizure is deemed to have acted voluntarily
because s/he voluntarily put himself/herself behind the wheel).
30 See infra notes 122-54 and accompanying text.
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I1. CRIINAL CULPABILrrY"
WHAT ARE RASKOLNIKOV'S CRIMES?
Raskolnikov' s conduct was criminal only if, in addition to the actus
reus, his state of mind, or mens rea, was criminal as well." To deter-
mine which crimes he can be charged with, it is helpful to look one by
one into all Raskolnikov's acts, focusing on his state of mind and
surrounding circumstances.
A. Murder of the Old Moneylender
The Model Penal Code states that, as a general rule,32 criminal
homicide committed purposely or knowingly constitutes murder.33 There
is no question that Raskolnikov killed Alyona Ivanovna acting under a
carefully thought out plan in order to reach several goals, both proximate
and remote. Raskolnikov had two immediate purposes: one, to prove to
himself that he was able to "step over the blood,"34 that he was indeed
an "extraordinary man" to whom "everything is permitted;" and two, to
get the old moneylender's money The more remote aims included
helping his mother and sister, as well as all of humankind through the use
of the murdered woman's money
To negate the charge of murder, Raskolnikov can raise two possible
arguments. He can either claim that he never had any intention of killing
Alyona Ivanovna and thus the homicide was not committed "purposely,"
or he can plead "extreme mental or emotional disturbance" which, under
section 210.3(1)(b) of the Model Penal Code, would reduce the charge to
manslaughter.3
5
The first argument could be based on the theory that Raskolnikov did
not really intend to kill the old moneylender. He was only playing with
31 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 11, § 1.13(5).
32 But see id. § 210.3(1)(b) (providing exception to this rule). See mnfra
notes 35 & 42 and accompanying text.
31 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 11, § 210.2(1)(a).
14 See Cox, supra note 23, at 43, for an interesting suggestion that, given
Raskolnikov's youth, this murder can be interpreted as initiation rite. "Making
the proof of manhood an experimental murder, Raskolnikov fuses questions of
personal identity and etics in a way that has been a seminal influence on the
existentialist thinkers of the twentieth century." Id.
35 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 11, § 210.3(l)(b).
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a moral puzzle, entertaining himself with a completely theoretical
intellectual proposition.3 6 "'Listen: when I went to the old woman that
evening, I only went to see. I'd like you to know that," 37 appeals
Raskolnikov to Sonya.
If we believe these words, then there is no causal connection between
the homicide that eventually took place and its preceding months-long
planning. It could be argued that what Raskolnikov arranged was just a
mental test, an elaborate showdown with himself: "'I had to find out
then, and as quickly as possible, whether I was a louse like the rest or a
man. Whether I can step over or not.""'3 In that test, Raskolnikov
wanted to come close to the edge of the powerful and ancient prohibition
against killing another human, and maybe even look down into the abyss
- but he had no intentions of taking a step off tlus edge. However, when
faced with the situation that he himself created, Raskolnikov could not
pull himself back - and killed. Drawing on tlus theory, an argument
could be made that the homicide was committed not purposely39 or
knowingly, 0 but rather recklessly-4 Raskolnikov knew that the circum-
stances and his own emotional state were such that he could kill. Despite
that knowledge of risk, he went to Alyona Ivanovna and indeed killed
her. Therefore, the homicide should be viewed as a manslaughter covered
36 See, e.g., Philip Rahv, Dostoevsky in Crime and Pumshment, in
DOSTOEVSKY" A COLLECTION OF CRITICAL EssAYs 16, 19 (Rene Welleck ed.,
1962).
" DosToEvSKY, supra note 1, at 433.
38 Id. at 433.
'9 See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 11, § 2.02(2)(a)(i) ("A person acts
purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when if the
element involves the nature of hIs conduct or a result thereof, it is is conscious
object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result ").
40 See id. § 2.02(2)(b)(ii) ("A person acts knowingly with respect to a
material element of an offense when if the element involves a result of his
conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such
a result.").
"1 See id. § 2.02(2)(c) ("A person acts recklessly with respect to a material
element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct.
The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and
purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstancesknown to him, its disregard
involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person
would observe in the actor's situation.").
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by section 210.3(1)(a),42 but not as a murder covered by section
210.2(1)(a).43
This line of reasoning, however, is very tenuous and to a certain
degree self-contradictory What Raskolnikov intended to test was his
ability to commit a murder. He came to Alyona Ivanovna's apartment
fully intending to try to kill her He did not know whether he would be
able to - and, in fact, came very close to failing: for a moment "[h]e felt
that he was losing his grip, that he was frightened - so frightened,
indeed, that if she had looked at him like that without uttering a word for
another tirty seconds, he would have run away from her." However,
even this quote, showing Raskolnikov's sudden grip of pamc because of
what he was about to do, proves that he knew he came to kill, not just to
tease himself with the idea of murder.
In addition, the lack-of-intent argument must fail when the extent and
surrounding circumstances of Raskolnikov's recklessness are given a
closer look. Even assuming, arguendo, that Raskolnikov had no true
homicidal intentions and killed Alyona Ivanovna recklessly, he would still
be guilty of murder under section 210.2(1)(b), which classifies reckless
homicide as a murder when it is committed "under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life."'45
Raskolnikov demonstrated such extreme indifference when he treated the
life of another human being as means of proving or disproving Ins pet
moral theory Even if Raskolnikov had not intended Alyona Ivanovna to
die, he created a situation in which her life was but a stake in a game of
testing his extraordinariness.
Finally, the Model Penal Code notes that "[s]uch recklessness and
indifference are presumed if the actor is engaged in the commission
of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to
commit robbery ,46 It could be argued that Raskolnikov was not
guilty of robbery,47 and, therefore this presumption should not be used
against him. Given the facts of his case, though, it is unlikely that this
argument would succeed.48 It could be further argued that, even if the
presumption of extreme recklessness is used, that presumption may be
42 Id. § 210.3(1)(a) ("Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughterwhen
it is committed recklessly ").
41 See id. § 210.2(1)(a).
44 DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 95.
4- MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 11, § 210.2(l)(b).
46 Id. § 210.2(b).
41 See mnfra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
48 See infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
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rebutted by other evidence. This is true, but the novel offers no evidence
in support of the proposition that Raskolnikov indeed cared about the life
of the old woman moneylender and her killing was just an accident.
Another, and a more plausible, way to reduce Raskolnikov's crime
from murder to manslaughter is by using section 210.3(1)(b). This section
specifically provides that "criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter
when a homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which
there is reasonable explanation or excuse."'49 There are three elements
in this provision: (1) there is a homicide which in the absence of this
provision would be a murder; (2) the homicide was committed under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; and (3) there is a
reasonable explanation or excuse for this disturbance.
The first two elements do not present a problem: the killing which
would otherwise be a murder under either 210.2(l)(a) or 210.2(1)(b), was
likely to have been committed under the influence of mental or emotional
disturbance. The Model Penal Code provision does not define "extreme"
disturbance, but it is quite possible that Raskolnikov's condition would
qualify 50 A more serious question arises with respect to the third
element: was there a reasonable explanation or excuse for such distur-
bance? Section 210.3(l)(b) provides that "[tihe reasonableness of such
explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person
in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes them to
be." Thus, this test is almost entirely subjective, allowing, among
other things, a mistake or delusion to form the basis for a reasonable
excuse.
52
The subjective test for reasonableness under section 210.3(l)(b) is not
easy to apply First, it is necessary to determine what can be included
into "the circumstances as he believes them to be." Should they be
limited to Raskolnikov's anguish over the fact that his sister and mother
were ruming their lives to help him out? Or should they include
Raskolnikov's belief that his ability to commit the murder would forever
put him above the pitiful masses and prove his "extraordinanty?" And
would the realization that he is about to murder another human being
qualify as a reasonable explanation for Raskolnikov's mentally and
emotionally disturbed state? At least to the last two questions the
49 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 11, § 210.3(l)(b).
"O See infra notes 124-35 and accompanymg text.
5' MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 11, § 210.3(l)(b).
52 Id., Comment to § 210.3, at 62-63.
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answer is "no." Commentaries to the Model Penal Code explain that
"idiosyncratic moral values are not part of the actor's situation Any
other result would undermine the normative message of the criminal
law."5
3
As to a possible argument of diminshed capacity caused by the
anguish and emotional disturbance, the Model Penal Code rejects it as a
distinct category of mitigation.54 On the other hand, if presented as part
of the actor's "situation,"55 the same diminished capacity argument, may
be more successful. As the comment to section 210.3 notes, "the Model
Code takes no position on diminished responsibility in this sense of the
term but leaves the issue, together with many others, as part of the
generic problem of determining the extent to which the actor's individual
characteristics should be taken into account in the formula., 56
This generic problem is artfully illustrated in the novel itself.
Dostoevsky creates a whole gallery of people "in Raskolnikov's
situation," starting with a fellow student Razumikhn 57 at one end of the
spectrum and finishing with his sister's employer Svidngailov 8 at the
other. Each of these characters persomfies and develops some of
Raskolnikov's possible explanations and excuses: poverty, inability to pay
for the education, concern about the family's situation, and, finally,
obsession with the idea that power belongs to those who dare.
In a way, all these characters are Raskolnikov's alter egos and
opponents at the same time. Each of them chose a different way out of
3 Id., Comment to § 210.3, at 62.
54 Id., Comment to § 210.3, at 72.
5 See id., Comment to § 210.3, at 62-63 (noting that "the word 'situation'
is designedly ambiguous" and that, generally, it is meant to include such
circumstances as blindness, shock from traumatic injury or extreme grief, and
exclude idiosyncratic moral values, but admitting that "[i]n between these two
extremes, however, there are matters neither as clearly distinct from individual
blameworthiness as blindness or handicap nor as integral a part of moral
depravity as a belief in the rightness of killing").
56 Id., Comment to § 210.3, at 73.
7 See NUTTAL, supra note 16, at 88-89 (correctly noting that "Razumikhm
like Raskolnikov is poor; unlike Raskolnikov he keeps himself working").
" For an interesting comparison of Raskolnikov and Svdngailov, see
Edward Wasiolek, Raskolnikov's Motives: Love and Murder, in FYODOR
DOSTOEVSKY'S CRiME AND PUNISHMENT 11, 21-22 (H. Bloom ed., 1988);
NUTTAL, supra note 16, at 54 ("Svidngailov is what is called a 'Dostoevskian
double'; that is a figure deliberately paralleling that of the main character,
confronting him with an answering image of Ins own mind.").
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his or her situation. Razumikhin's was the rationalist way of hard work
and strict economy Sonya's and Dunya's way was self-sacrifice: to
support her father's family, Sonya became a prostitute; to help out her
mother and brother, Dunya was about to sell herself into a miserable
marriage. Finally, Svidngailov's way out of boredom, loneliness, and
inherent senselessness of existence, was sexual aggressiveness and
eventual suicide.59
Would these characters, as "person[s] in the actor's situation,"
consider Raskolnikov's circumstances to be of such seventy that they
could lead one to commit homicide? Probably not, since all of the
characters found themselves fighting with similar circumstances but none
(with the possible exception of Svidrigailov whose past is suspicious)
stepped over the life of another human being to reach his or her goal. As
a scholar of Dostoevsky's novels correctly pointed out, "[o]ther men have
suffered the torment, both economic and moral, that Raskolnkov suffers,
but they have not committed murder."60
Additionally, it is important to keep in mind that whatever
Raskolnikov believed his circumstances to be, that belief was not the only
reason for his mental state. A much more powerful reason was his desire
to kill in order to prove himself an "extraordinary" man: "'I - I wanted
to dare and - I committed a murder."' 61 Since a desire to kill clearly
cannot be pleaded as a mitigating circumstance for the murder committed
under this desire, section 210.3(1)(b) would not help Raskolnikov to
reduce his culpability from murder to manslaughter.
B. Murder of Lizaveta
Lizaveta's murder is different from Alyona Ivanovna's in that it was
certainly not planned. In fact, Raskolnikov decided to go forward with the
killing of the moneylender only after he had learned that Lizaveta would
not be at home that evening. This is how Raskolnikov (talking of himself
in the third person) described to Sonya what had happened: "'He didn't
mean to - to kill Lizaveta. He - he killed her accidentally He intended
to kill the old woman when - when she was alone and - and he went
and - and then Lizaveta came in. So - he killed her, too."' 62
59 BREGER, supra note 4, at 45-46 (noting that "sex is all that can give a
spark of interest m his life but, ultimately, it is an empty game and
Svidngailov has become bored to the pomt of death").
60 NUTrAL, supra note 16, at 88.
61 DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 431.
62 Id. at 424.
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Even though the second homicide was "quite unexpected," '63 tis
fact does not reduce Raskolnikov's culpability The Model Penal Code
does not distinguish between premeditated and unpremeditated murder.6'
The homicide was committed knowingly, with a clear purpose of
eliminating the witness of the first crime, and thus, according to section
210.2(1)(a), was a murder. In the case of Lizaveta's homicide,
Raskolnikov was obviously not concerned with any intellectual puzzles.
He simply killed in order not to get caught.
An attempt to reduce this murder to manslaughter by reason of
extreme emotional disturbance - under section 210.3(1)(b) - is likely to
fail. It could be argued that the second murder was committed in the state
of such disturbance, and that this state had a reasonable explanation,
namely another murder ten minutes earlier. However, it is very unlikely
that, even with the help of the subjective test of section 210.3(1)(b),"
this argument would succeed under the Model Penal Code66 and help to
reduce Raskolnikov's liability for Lizaveta's murder to a manslaughter.
Therefore, both Lizaveta's and Alyona Ivanovna's homicides
constituted murder under the Model Penal Code. Moreover, both cases
qualify as aggravated murders - under section 210.6(3)(e)67 (murder
accompaied by robbery) and under section 210.6(c)6" (murder
accompanied by another murder).
C. Robbery
Under the Model Penal Code, Raskolnikov's taking of the old
moneylender's money and valuables may qualify as either theft or
robbery Theft is defined in section 223.2(1) as when "[a] person
unlawfully takes, or exercises unlawful control over, movable property of
another with purpose to deprive him thereof." 69 Raskolnikov, who took
Alyona Ivanovna's money and jewelry with the intent to use them to help
63 Id. at 99.
64 See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 11, § 210.2(1)(a) ("criminal
homicide constitutes murder when committed purposely or knowingly").
65 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
66 See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 11, § 102(3).
67 See id. § 210.6(3)(e) ("The murder was committed while the defendant
was engaged . in the commission of or flight after committing
robbery.").
68 See id. § 210.6(3)(c) ("At the time the murder was committed the
defendant also committed another murder.").
69 See id. § 223.2(1).
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his family as well as for his own benefit, clearly can be charged with
theft. Even if the money and valuables were only a rationalization for
Raskolnikov's desire "to step over the blood," a pretext for the killing,7"
still at the time of the crime, Raskolnikov was acting with a clear intent
to deprive the old woman of her property 71
Robbery includes theft as a lesser offense and also requires that, "in
the course of committing a theft, [the actor] commits any felony
of the first or second degree."72 The following additional elements,
therefore, have to be established in order to prove robbery- (1) there has
to be a felony of the first or second degree, and (2) this felony has to be
committed in the course of the theft.
The first element is clearly present, because the two homicides
committed by Raskolnikov are, at the very least, manslaughters; and a
manslaughter is a felony of the second degree.73 As to the second
element, section 222.1(1) explains that an act is deemed "'in the course
of committing a theft' if it occurs in an attempt to commit theft or in
flight after the attempt or commission."'74 The theft was committed in
the period of time between the two murders. But whether these murders
were committed "in the course of the theft" may depend on the motives
we assign to the murders themselves. It could be argued that the first
murder was committed with the sole purpose to dare, not with the
purpose to facilitate a theft and, thus, was not "in the course of the theft."
As Raskolnikov confessed later, "'I only wanted to dare, Soma, that was
my only motive!"'7,
It could be further argued that the second murder was committed in
the course of a flight after the murder, not after the theft and, thus, was
not "in the course of the theft" either. Therefore, Raskolnikov's crime
should be characterized as theft under section 223.2, not as robbery under
section 222.1.
Depending on whether this argument succeeds, the categorization of
Raskolnikov's crime would differ sigificantly If the homicides are
found to be committed "in the course of theft," Raskolnikov would be
70 "'[I]t was not money, Soma, I was after when I did it. No, it was not so
much the money I wanted as something else. I know it all now."' DOSTOEVSKY,
supra note 1, at 432.
71 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 11, § 223.2(1).
72 Id. § 222.1(1)(c).
73 Id. § 210.3(2).
74 Id. § 222.1(1).
71 DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 431.
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guilty of robbery, a felony of the first degree.76 If, on the other hand,
the homicides were not "in the course of theft," then Raskolnikov's theft
would be a felony of the third degree 7 or even a misdemeanor.
71
The success of this line of reasoning, though, is very unlikely The
murders and the theft were closely interrelated. The fact that Raskolnikov
may have had a complicated motive for the murder of Alyona Ivanovna
does not negate the connection between the first killing and the theft.
Moreover, when Raskolnikov killed Lizaveta, he clearly did that "in flight
after the commission" of both a murder and a theft. Therefore,
Raskolnikov can be charged with robbery, which is a felony of the first
degree under section 222.1(2).
III. RASKOLNIKoV'S DEFENSES
A. Justification Defenses: Balance of Evils and Self-Defense
The Model Penal Code generally justifies "[c]onduct that the actor
believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to
another,"'79 if "the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct
is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense
charged."8 Tis provision, thus, combines two standards: the subjective
belief of the actor in the necessity of the act, and the objective "balance
of evils."
The "balance of evils," ends versus means, is one of the questions
most important for Dostoevsky" do people have the right to commit vile
acts for good ends; does any end, however beneficial to the many, justify
inhuman treatment of the few.8 In Crime and Punishment, it is a
nameless student in a restaurant who first poses the question:
76 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 11, § 222.1(2).
77 Id. § 223.1(2)(a).
78 Id. § 223.1(2)(b). Whether this theft is to be a felony of the third degree
or a misdemeanor, depends, m a peculiar fashion, on the ruble/dollar exchange
rate in 1865. Under, section 223.1(2)(a), "[t]heft constitutes a felony of the third
degree if the amount involved exceeds $500 " Theft not within tis
paragraph constitutes a misdemeanor. Raskolnikov happened to steal three
hundred and seventeenrubles and sixty kopecks. He also took some jewelry. The
total amount is, therefore, unclear but it could be below $500. The success or
failure of the preceding argument could be the difference between first degree
felony and a simple misdemeanor.
71 Id. § 3.02(1).
80 Id. § 3.02(I)(a).
81 See, e.g., KRAVCHENKO, supra note 2, at 164.
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"[O]n the one hand, we have a stupid, senseless, worthless, wicked,
and decrepit old hag, who is of no use to anybody and who actually
does harm to everybody, a creature who does not know herself what she
is living for and who will be dead soon, anyway.
On the other hand, we have a large number of young promising
people who are going to rack and ruin without anyone lifting a finger
to help them Hundreds, perhaps thousands of lives could be saved,
dozens of families could be rescued from a life of poverty, from decay
and rum, from vice and hospitals for venereal diseases - and all with
her money Kill her, take her money, and with its help devote yourself
to the service of humanity and the good of all. Well, don't you think
that one little crime could be expiated and wiped out by thousands of
good deeds?" 2
Raskolnikov, who happened to listen to the conversation, "was greatly
agitated" on hearing "the expression of just such ideas at the very
moment when exactly the same ideas were just beginning to stir m his
own mmd."
8 3
The argument, put forward by the student, is a typical case of the
classic utilitarian "maximization of happiness" principle, so widespread
among the Russian "radical men of the 1860s., 84 Dostoevsky was
horrified by this philosophy 85 Occupying the opposite end of the moral
spectrum, he was adamant in his answer: the ends can never justify the
means.
8 6
Utilitarian ideas form the basis for Raskolnikov's justification of Is
murder of the old moneylender.8 7 As Dostoevsky explained in an 1865
82 DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 84.
83 Id. at 85.
84 See Derek Offord, The Causes of Crime and the Meaning of Law: Crime
and Pumshment and ContemporaryRadical Thought, in FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY'S
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 58, at 81, 88-89.
85 For Dostoevsky's argument with utilitarians, see LINDA KRAEGER & JOE
BARNHART, DOSTOEVSKY ON EVIL AND ATONEMENT: THE ONTOLOGY OF
PERSONALISM IN His MAJOR FICTION 138-41 (1992); see also NUTTAL, supra
note 16, at 15-36 (discussion ofDostoevsky's disagreementwith Chermshevsky's
views which were based on the philosophy of Mill and Bentham).
86 See Robert Louis Jackson, The Clumsy White Flower, in TwENTIETH
CENTURY INTERPRETATIONS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 1, 3 (Robert L. Jackson
ed., 1974).
87 See NUTrAL, supra note 16, at 38 (noting that Raskolnikov supposes
himself an adherent of utilitarian theory; "[t]his, indeed, is Ins first reason for
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letter to Ins prospective publisher: "'The old woman is stupid, greedy,
deaf and ill; she charges exorbitant interest on her loans; she is bad-
tempered and she is runmng the life of her younger sister whom she
keeps as a drudge. She is absolutely worthless, there seems to be no
justification for her existence, etc.' , 88 Dostoevsky further explained that
in Raskolnikov's view, the murder is completely justified because how
can one "'call a crime flus murder of a stupid and wicked old woman
who serves no useful purpose m life and who, besides, would most
probably not live for more than a few months anyhow."' 89
Raskolnikov, therefore, stresses two points: first, the old moneylend-
er's life is of no value to the society, and second, there is not much of
this life left anyway Interestingly, both of these points are emphatically
rebutted at the scene of the murder when Raskolnikov, caught by
Lizaveta, has to kill her as well. Lizaveta's life is not approaching a
natural end - she is only thirty-five years old and very healthy She also
seems to be almost unanimously liked or at least pitied; she is hardwork-
ing, "'quiet , gentle, timid, and acquiescent. And she has also a
very sweet smile."' 90
Just as Raskolnikov does not think of the murder of Alyona Ivanovna
as a crime, he does not view the taking of her money as a morally
reprehensible act. For him, this robbery was just a redistribution of
wealth, an "expropriation of the expropriator,"9' to use the popular
marxist vocabulary of his younger Russian contemporaries. Raskolnikov's
personal beliefs regarding lus victims and their property, would not of
course justify his acts either for Dostoevsky or under the Model Penal
Code. As a comment to the latter explains, what is required is "that the
harm or evil sought to be avoided be greater than that which would be
caused by the commission of the offense, not that the defendant believe
it to be so."92 A more challenging argument Raskolnikov might put
forward is whether his acts may be justified objectively, as eventually
saving more lives than taking.
Adamant to reject flus argument, Dostoevsky takes an intellectual
"shortcut," using the plot and composition of the novel to defeat the
committing murder").
88 DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 12 (Translator'sIntroduction quoting letter
from Dostoevsky to Katkov (Sept. 1865)).
'
9Id. at 13.
'0 Id. at 84.
9' See KARL MARX, CAPITAL 837 (Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling trans.,
1936); see also Offord, supra note 84.92 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 11, Comment to § 3.02, at 12.
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utilitarian moral theory Raskolnikov, having killed the old moneylender,
is forced by the chain of events to kill Lizaveta as well, with no
utilitarian excuse for it. Having taken the money, the ostensible cause for
the murder, he hides it under a stone and never has a chance to "benefit
mankind" or even to save a single life with it.
Dostoevsky makes his point that not only can the ends not justify the
means, but also that good ends cannot be produced by bad means.
However, his victory is rather a pyrrhic one. In Crime and Punishment,
he essentially evaded the ultimate question of justification: even had
Raskolnikov helped his family, provided for the orphaned Sonya's step-
siblings, and benefited mankind m various ways, would this all still
justify the murder of the repulsive old moneylender?"
The Model Penal Code, at first glance, seems to answer this question
in the affirmative, in accord with the utilitarian balancing approach. A
comment to Section 3.02 explains that the defense of justification is not
foreclosed to the defendant who killed one in order to save the lives of
many 94 The comment goes on to admit that "the view is not universally
held that it is ethically preferable to take one innocent life than to have
many lives lost,"9" but expresses a belief that "most persons probably
think a net saving of lives is ethically warranted if the choice among lives
to be saved is not unfair."96 Read literally, this comment would seem to
support Raskolnikov's balancing theory Moreover, since the Model Penal
Code does not require that the evil sought to be avoided be imminent,
97
' Later in his writing career, Dostoevsky unequivocally answered the
question of whether there is ever ajustification for sacrificing an innocent for the
benefit of others. The Brothers Karamazov (1879-80) contains Dostoevsky's
famous formula that even the happiness of the whole mankind would not justify
a single tear of a child. See Vasili Rozanov, F.M. Dostoevsky's Legend of the
Grand Inquisitor- An Essay in Critical Commentary (1924), abstracted in
VLADIMIR SEDURO, DosTovEvsKY IN RussIAN LITERARY CRiTicisM 1846-1956,
48-49 (E. Simmons ed., 1957) (noting that Dostoevsky abhorred murder as
breaking the moral law of humanity).
94 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 11, Comment to § 3.02, at 14.
It would be particularly unfortunate to exclude homicidal conduct from
the scope of the defense. For, recogmzmg that the sanctity of life has
a supreme place m the hierarchy of values, it is nonetheless true that
conduct that results m taking life may promote the very value sought to
be protected by the law of homicide.
Id.
95 Id. at 15.
96 Id.
9 Id. at 16.
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Raskolnikov could argue that, in the long run, he would be able to "'save
thousands of lives from corruption and decay One death in exchange for
a hundred lives - why, it's a simple sum in arithmetic!"' 98
After a closer look, however, it becomes clear that the set of
circumstances envisioned by the comment differs from Raskolnikov's in
a meaningful way- the comment describes a situation in which a group
of people have to die and the defendant has an opportunity to save some
of them by killing the rest.99 Raskolnikov's victims, by contrast, are not
part of the endangered group - they would not have died anyway had
Raskolnikov done nothing. In sum, it is doubtful that Dostoevsky would
justify killing an innocent person under any circumstances; and it is clear
that Raskolnikov cannot pass even the more relaxed test of the Model
Penal Code to justify either the murders he committed or the accompany-
ing robbery 100
It is also highly unlikely that Raskolnikov's crimes could be justified
on a theory that he himself desperately needed the money As the
comment to section 3.02 explains, "even if the defendant genuinely
believes that the life of another is less valuable than his own financial
security, his conduct would not be justified under Subsection (1)(a)."''
Moreover, Dostoevsky eliminates any possibility of the justification
defense by denying Raskolnikov true subjective belief in the necessi-
ty 02 of his crime in order to avoid "harm or evil to himself or to
another." It is true that Raskolnikov tried to persuade himself that
the murder and robbery of Alyona Ivanovna were in fact necessary- to
save his sister Dunya from the marriage which, in Raskolnikov's firm
belief, would rum her life; to support his old mother; to complete his
studies at the umversity; and, finally, to benefit mankind. Dostoevsky
makes clear, however, that these motives played only a secondary role
in Raskolnikov's decision to kill the old moneylender. Raskolnikov
" DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 84.
99 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 11, Comment to § 3.02, at 14-15
(situations described include an actor who makes a breach m a dike, knowing
that flus will inundate a farm and kill its inhabitants, but taking the only course
available to save a whole town; or a mountaineer, roped to a companion who has
fallen over the precipice, who holds on as long as possible but eventually cuts
the rope).
"' See supra notes 92-98 and infra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
101 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 11, Comment to § 3.02, at 12.
102 See id. ("It is not enough that the actor believes that his behavior possibly
may be conducive to ameliorating certain evils; he must believe it is 'necessary'
to avoid the evils.").
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started planning the murder long before he learned about Dunya's
decision. He did not consider his mother's financial situation desperate,
otherwise he probably would not have accepted regular financial support
from her. He could have continued his studies, as he himself admitted to
Sonya:
"I told you a moment ago that I couldn't keep myself at the university.
But do you know that I might perhaps have done it? Mother would have
sent me enough to pay my fees, and I could have earned enough to pay
for my clothes, boots, and food. But I got bitter, and I didn't want
to work."'13
Finally, a couple of minutes later, came the real truth which
completely forecloses the defense of justification:
"I wanted to murder, Soma, to murder without casuistry, to murder for
my own satisfaction, for myself alone. I didn't want to lie about it. I did
not commit this murder [to help out my mother - that is nonsense.]"°
Nor did I kill in order to become the benefactor of humanity by gaining
wealth and power - that, too, is nonsense. I just did it; I did it for
myself alone, and at that moment I did not care a damn whether I
would become the benefactor of someone, or would spend the rest of
my life like a spider catching them all in my web and sucking the living
juices out of them."' '
Thus Dostoevsky morally convicts Raskolnikov by denying hun not
only the objective necessity, but also subjective true belief in such
necessity Similarly, the Model Penal Code, which requires the actor to
believe that his or her act is necessary to avoid a greater harm or
evil, 10 6 forecloses to Raskolnikov any possibility of justification for the
murder and robbery of Alyona Ivanovna.
Would there be any possibility of the justification defense in the
murder of Lizaveta? Self-defense could be attempted under the theory
that Raskolnikov-had to kill Lizaveta in order to save his own life. Under
the Model Penal Code, though, this theory is bound to fail. Section
103 DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 430.
'o Omitted from the English translation. See F.M. DOSTOEVSKY,
PRESTUPLENIE NAXAZANiE 406-07 (Fndlender & Khrapchenko eds., 1982).
'o5 DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 432.
106 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 11, § 3.02(1).
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3.04(1) makes use of force upon another person "justifiable when the
actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of
protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person
on the present occasion."' 7 Raskohnikov knew there was no threat of
the use of force on the part of Lizaveta:
[S]he did not even lift her hands to protect her face, though that was the
most natural and inevitable gesture at that moment, for the hatchet was
now raised straight over her face. All she did was to lift her free left
hand a little, at some distance from her face, and extend it slowly
towards the hatchet as though pushing it away.' 8
This description of Lizaveta's behavior preceding her murder proves
that Raskolnikov's use of force against her was totally unjustified. As to
a possible claim of necessity to kill Lizaveta in order to clear the way for
escape and thus protect himself from an imminent arrest, such reason is
most certainly not covered by the defense of self-protection.' 9 Thus
Raskolnikov would not be able to invoke justification as a defense to any
of his crimes.
B. Excuse Defenses: Duress and Insanity
Justification and excuse defenses are conceptually different:" 0
To say that someone's conduct is "justified" ordinarily connotes that the
conduct is thought to be right, or at least not undesirable; to say that
someone's conduct is "excused" ordinarily connotes that the conduct is
thought to be undesirable but that for some reason the actor is not to be
blamed for it."'
Raskolnikov could try to invoke two excuse defenses: duress (or
compulsion) and Insanity The duress defense can be granted to an actor
who committed what otherwise would be an offense "because he was
107 Id. § 3.04(1).
"I8 DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 99
109 See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 11, Comment to § 3.04, at 32-61
(explaining situations covered by the law of self-protection).
"o See SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW
AND ITS PROCESS 935 (1989).
"'. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 11, Introduction to Art. 3, at 3.
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coerced to do so by the use of unlawful force against his person or
the person of another, that a person of reasonable firmness in his situation
would have been unable to resist."' 2 Raskolnikov could try to claim
coercion by poverty, intolerable living conditions, or family circumstanc-
es.
In his attempt to exculpate himself in Sonya's eyes as well as in hIs
own, he tries all these arguments. He attempts to find excuse m Ins
poverty and intolerable living conditions: "'You've seen my hovel,
haven't you? And do you realize, Sonia, that low ceilings and small,
poky little rooms warp both mind and soul? Oh, how I loathed that hovel
of mine!' """ This argument is well presented by Atkin, a scholar who
claims that Raskolnikov, frustrated, humiliated, and embittered by his
poverty, saw no recourse but murder to enable him to survive in a society
that was so lacking in its duty to the individual and so indifferent to his
needs." 4 This observation, however, even assuming it correctly reflects
Raskolnikov's subjective feelings, cannot support a claim of duress
because economic or psychological hardship is not covered by section
2.09 "5
In addition, even were Raskolnikov able to circumvent the limitations
of section 2.09(1), he would probably still be barred by section 2.09(2)
which denies the defense to the actor who "recklessly placed himself in
a situation in which it was probable that he would be subject to du-
ress."'" 6 Raskolnikov's situation is, to a large degree, a result of Ins
own free choice. It has been correctly noted that "Raskolnikov's poverty
is due to his own refusal to work. He could have earned money doing
translations, as Razumikhin has done, but he chose not to...1.
There is somewhat more merit to the claim that Raskolnikov was
coerced to commit the cnmes by the pressure from his family It could
be argued that, although he had been contemplating the murder and
robbery of the old moneylender for months, it would have remained pure
theory had he not received a letter from his mother describing how she
and his sister were going to ruin their lives in order to help Raskolnikov
out. As a scholar of Dostoevsky persuasively pointed out,
112 Id. § 2.09(1).
11 DosToEvsKY, supra note 1, at 430.
"14 I. Atkin, Raskolnikov" The Study ofa Cnmznal, 5 J. CLIN. & EXPERIMEN-
TAL PSYCH. 255 (1943).
"1 See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 11, Comment to § 2.09, at 375-80
(discussing the scope of the duress defense).
116 Id. § 2.09(2).
"I BREGER, supra note 4, at 23.
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The most strilng and invidious of all examples of emotional blackmail
is to be found in Mine Raskolnikova's letter to her son. [She] is not
trying to make her son do anything, she is simply anxious that he
should appreciate the nature of the sacrifices being made for love of
him. The letter is designed to make its recipientfeel as strongly as
possible by making him fully aware of the true extent of his sister's
sacrifice." 8
But, even if the acute sense of guilt created by his mother's letter was a
plausible reason for Raskolnikov's emotional disturbance, it would still
not be sufficient for the duress defense, because there was nothing
"unlawful"" 9 in her conduct, and it cannot be said that her pressure was
such that "a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have
been unable to resist."'2 As well put in a study of Crime and Punish-
ment, "the whole 'family pressure' thesis has only to be stated m bald
terms for its inadequacy to be plain: Raskolnikov's family wrought upon
his guilt feelings so much that he became seriously disturbed; and so he
went off and cut up two old women with an axe."''
This leaves Raskolnikov with a single, and probably the strongest,
excuse defense left - insanity That something is wrong with him is
apparent: "One is immediately struck by the seventy of [Raskolnikov's]
disturbance, his isolation from people and withdrawal from reality, the
lability of his moods, and the crazed quality of this thoughts.' 22
However, whether Raskolnikov's emotional problems would grant him
the defense of insanity under the Model Penal Code is not so self-evident.
The Model Penal Code provides that "[a] person is not responsible
for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental
disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the
criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform hs conduct to
the requirements of law."'2 Thus the defense of insanity is allowed m
two situations: one, in the situation of cognitive impairment sufficient to
establish that the defendant lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct; and two, in the situation of volitional
118 ALEX DE JONGE, DOSTOEVSKY AND THE AGE OF INTENSITY 198-99
(1975).
"9 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 11, § 2.09(1).
120 rd.
12 NUTrAL, supra note 16, at 88.
122 BREGER, supra note 4, at 22.
'2 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 11, § 4.01(1).
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impairment when the defendant lacks substantial capacity to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law In both cases, this defense is
available only to those whose impairment is a result of mental disease or
defect.
The first question, therefore, is whether Raskolnikov was mentally ill.
Raskolnikov felt sick already before the crime; after the crime, his
condition deteriorated: "he was m a feverish condition, delirious and half-
conscious."'24 His friend Razumiklun was sure that Raskolnikov had a
mental illness, and Raskolnikov lmself agreed that he had "a tendency
to madness."' 25 His mother started crying when she first saw him after
her arrival in St. Petersburg, because m his look "she caught a glimpse
of poignant suffering and of something unbending and almost insane,
too."'2 6 A doctor who attended hun and who was, in everyone's
opinion, "good at his job"'27 believed that Raskolnikov was "'crazy, or
just about.' ,12
A number of authors who studied Raskolnikov's character in the
novel came to the conclusion that he was, if not insane, at least mentally
ill. They are not in agreement as to the nature of his illness, though. For
example, Smith and Isotoff treat Raskolnikov as a clinical case in
psychiatry and classify lum as dem-fou and a case of "lucid madness" as
described by Grasset. They come to the conclusion that Raskolnikov was
an autistic personality with manic-depressive inclinations. These factors
caused his idea of becoming an "extraordinary" man to develop into a
delusion, and the irresistible inner urge to test his theory forced
Raskolnikov to commit his crimes. 2 9
Nuttal, speaking about Raskolnikov, points out that "clearly, he is to
some extent what we today call schizophrenic,"' 30 and continues: "On
the one hand, [Raskolnikov] is a real systematic thinker, whose thought
has brought him into strange territory and stranger company On the other
hand, he is mamfestly sick, the victim rather than the controller of his
mental processes, seriously cut off from reality",'
124 DosToEvsKY, supra note 1, at 136.
121 Id. at 430.
126 Id. at 214.
127 Id. at 150.
121 Id. at 210.
129 S. Stephenson Smith & Andrei Isotoff, The Abnormal from Within:
Dostoevsky, 22 AM. I PSYCHOANALYSIS 361 (1935).
130 NUTTAL, supra note 16, at 90.
"I Id. at 95.
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Burchell does not consider Raskolnikov to be a schzophrenic but
tfunks that the almost automatic manner in which Raskolnikov acted
during the murders had all the elements of a true compulsion and is
characteristic of unconsciously motivated acts - in this case, motivated
by a desire for punishment stemming from Raskolnikov's deep feelings
of guilt 32
The disagreement over Raskolnikov's mental problems is heightened
by the fact that not everybody believed him to be mentally ill. The two
characters in the novel who understood him best of all - Sonya and the
police detective Porfiry - did not: "The thought flashed through Soma's
mind: 'Is he mad?' but she at once dismissed it. No, there was something
else there."' Porfiry has read the article Raskolnikov wrote about the
"extraordinary man's" right to crime and understood the true motivation
behind Raskolnikov's conduct. Trying to persuade Raskolnikov to confess
to the police, Porfiry promised: "'We'll forget all about this psychology,
and I shall not breathe a word about these suspicions, so that your crime
will appear as somethng in the nature of a mental aberration , 134
Evidently, Porfiry didn't believe Raskolnikov to be mad, but thought
(correctly) 135 that the Russian court would consider Raskolnikov's
mental state to be a mitigating factor.
Whatever the nature of Raskolnikov's emotional or mental distur-
bance, it does not by itself absolve him from responsibility for his crimes.
The crucial question is not what was the name of his ailment, 36 but
rather whether it impaired his mind and will to the extent that he could
not appreciate that what he was doing was wrong, or could not conform
his conduct to the requirements of law
Did Raskolnikov appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct? At the
first glance, he did. The day before the murder, even after the "rehears-
al," the very thought of the prospective murder seemed repugnant to him:
"'When I was coming down the stairs yesterday I said to myself that the
whole thing was foul and disgusting. Why, the thought of it actually
132 S.C. Burchell, Dostoevsky and the Sense of Guilt, 17 PSYCHOANALYSIS
RFv 195 (1930).
133 DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 427
114 Id. at 470 (emphasis added).
135 See id. at 545.
136 As Nuttal wittily pointed out, "It]he concept 'schizophremc,' as we have
employed it, itself explains nothing. Those who thnk the entire matter cleared
up by such language are victims of what might be called the 'give it a Greek
name and consider it explained' fallacy." NUTrAL, supra note 16, at 104-05.
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made me feel sick and filled me with horror!"'" 37 On a closer look,
however, it becomes clear that what bothers Raskolnikov is not the
wrongfulness of murder, but rather the disgusting physical experience
through which he would have to go: "'[I]s it possible that I will really
take a hatchet, hit her on the head with it, crack her skull, slither about
in warm, sticky blood, break the lock, steal and shake with fear, hide
myself all covered in blood and with the hatchet - Good God! is it
possible?"" 38
One way to gauge whether the actor appreciates the wrongfulness of
his act is by the remorse he feels or does not feel afterwards. Raskolnikov
does not feel remorse or guilt for any of his crimes,' 39 at least not by
the time of his trial. He acknowledges that he violated the criminal code
- but that is all. 4 Regarding the murder of Alyona Ivanovna, he
continues to think that her killing was justified,'4 ' and his only concern
is with himself: "'Was it the old hag I killed? No, I killed myself, not the
old hag.' ,,,42 More than that, he feels sorry for himself, he feels cheated
- a victim, not the perpetrator: "'[T]he devil had dragged me there, and
it was only afterwards that he explained to me that I had no right to
go there because I was the same kind of louse as the rest. He made a
laughing stock of me 1 ,,i43
Lizaveta's murder does not bother Raskolnikov much either. For him
it was just an unfortunate by-product, something that he had to do - an
accident for which he feels sorry, but not guilty Similarly, he feels no
qualms about the robbery simply because it has no significance for him;
deep inside he always knew the robbery was just a pretext for the
opportunity to commit a murder.
It is possible thus to claim that Raskolnikov does not appreciate the
wrongfulness of his acts. But the Model Penal Code is not concerned
with actual feelings of the actor -just being amoral is not and could not
be a defense - but rather with his or her capacity to appreciate wrongful-
ness. In order to utilize the insaity defense, Raskolnikov would have to
137 DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 78.
138 Id.
'31 See Squires, supra note 4 (opining that Raskolnikov confessed in order
to nd himself of a burden, not because he repented; even in prison he recognized
his criminality only because he had been unsuccessful and had confessed it).
140 Jackson, supra note 86, at 2.
14' See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
142 DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 433.
143 Id.
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show not that he did not care, but that he could not care, could not
understand that what he was doing was wrong. That he cannot do.
As the comment to section 4.01 explains, "[a]ppreciating 'wrongful-
ness' may be taken to mean appreciating that the community regards the
behavior as wrongful."'" There is no question that Raskolnikov fully
appreciated the community's attitude regarding hs behavior. Moreover,
the true motive for the murder of the old moneylender was Raskolnikov's
desire to prove that he was an "extraordinary" man, that he was above the
moral law of the community - and the way to prove this was to "step
over blood," or commit the ultimate moral wrong. Thus the very nature
of his goal made it quite necessary for him to appreciate the wrongfulness
of his actions: he committed the murder because it was evil in the eyes
of "ordinary" people.
Since the cognitive impairment theory is unsustainable, Raskolnikov
has to rely on volitional inpairment - his inability "to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law."' 45 There is, in fact, evidence in the
text of the novel that at times Raskolnikov did not quite control his
actions. '46
A number of authors have observed that Raskolnikov committed "the
crime in a dream-like state,"' 47 he was acting "under some sort of
compulsion,"'48 "as if in a delirium."' 49 Later Raskolnikov himself
invoked the classic disclaimer of responsibility for his crimes: "'It was
the devil who killed the old hag, not I.' ,,'5'
Yet all the signs of compulsive behavior in Raskolnikov's actions do
not amount to total inability to control himself. As has been discussed
earlier,' Raskolnikov had numerous opportunities to stop before taking
the next step in the carrying out of his plan. In the process of committing
the crimes he analyzed the situation, made rational decisions and
implemented them. There is every reason to believe that he could have
abandoned his plan of murder and robbery had he only wanted to, and
that is inconsistent with a claim of volitional impairment.
It is not clear whether Raskolnikov's mental or emotional disturbance
was the source of his criminal plan or whether the causal connection was
144 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 11, Comment to § 4.01, at 169.
4- Id. § 401(1).
146 See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
,41 KRAVCHENKO, supra note 2, at 116.
,41 NUTTAL, supra note 16, at 90.
,49 MICHAEL J. HOLQUIST, DOSTOEVSKY AND THE NOVEL 89 (1977).
,50 DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 433.
' See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
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reversed: the very process of contemplating, playing out, and rehearsing
the crime led Raskolnikov, who was emotionally unstable by nature, into
the state of deep emotional disturbance which surrounded ins criminal
act.152 However, for someone who could appreciate the wrongfulness
of his acts and conform them to the requirements of law, this distinction
is insignificant under the Model Penal Code. The comment to section
4.01 denies the insanity defense to "persons who commit crimes under
the motivation of beliefs or attitudes resulting from mental illness, but
whose capacity for appreciating the criminality of their conduct and
conforming to the law's requirements is not seriously impaired."'53 It
goes on to explain that "[h]olding them legally irresponsible on the
ground that the mental disorder was an antecedent but for which the
criminal conduct would not have occurred would seem simply unprnci-
pled."'54 This approach to criminal responsibility forecloses the last
defense available to Raskolnikov He is guilty of two counts of murder
and a robbery, and he has no defenses which may reduce his culpability
IV PUNISHMENT
A. Raskolnikov's Sentence in Crime and Punishment
The sentence given to Raskolnikov by the judge in Crime and
Punishment is somewhat inconsistent with Russian penal laws of that
time, which Dostoevsky knew well. This is no accident, but rather a clue
pointing to Dostoevsky's position on punishment and interpretation of
Raskolnikov's crimes. For that reason, it is interesting to compare
Raskolnikov's actual sentence in the novel with the sentence he would
have received if the court in Crime and Punishment had been fully
152 Tlus explanation is in accord with Raskolnikov's own theory of crime as
a disease:
According to his conviction, [the disease] developed gradually and
reached its climax a short time before the crime was actually commit-
ted; it continued the same way at the moment of the crime and for a
short time afterwards, according to each individual; then it passed off
like any other disease. But the question whether the disease was the
cause of the crime, or whether the crime itself, owing to some
peculiarity of its nature, was always accompanied by something that is
very much like a disease, he did not as yet feel able to answer.
DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 90.
'13 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 11, Comment to § 4.01, at 173 n.24.
154 Id.
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informed or decided to strictly apply the law; and then to compare these
two sentences with the one Raskolnikov would have received under the
Model Penal Code.
The Code of Penal Laws, effective in Russia at the time of
Raskolnikov's trial, distmgushed between intentional premeditated
murder and intentional murder without premeditation. According to article
1453, in case of a premeditated murder committed for the purposes of
robbery.55 or, in general, in order to get possession of some property,
the convicted was to be sentenced to penal servitude or imprisonment for
a minimum term of fifteen to twenty years, or a maximum term of
life.'56 If, on the other hand, a murder, committed under exactly the
same circumstances, was not premeditated, article 1455 applied, and the
defendant had to be sentenced to a term of fifteen to twenty years.'57
The murder of Alyona Ivanovna, thus, is covered by article 1453,
whereas the murder of Lizaveta fits under article 1455.
In case the defendant was convicted of two or more crimes, he had
to be sentenced to the longest of the terms assigned to these crimes.' 8
Therefore, if the judge in Crime and Punishment strictly applied articles
1453 or 1455, Raskolnikov should have been sentenced to penal servitude
for life, or at least for the mnimum term of fifteen to twenty years.
Raskolnikov, however, was sentenced for the "term of only eight years,
the court having taken into consideration the prisoner's own confession
and a number of other extenuating circumstances."' 59 This pumshment
"was much more lenient than could have been expected from the nature
of the crime, and that was perhaps almost entirely due to the fact that the
criminal, far from trying to justify himself, seemed to be anxious to
incriminate himself more and more."' 60
This leniency had legal basis in the Russian Code of Penal Laws,
which diminshed the defendant's culpability in case of his confession and
repentance.' 6' Another mitigating circumstance, duly noted by the court,
155 A murder committed for the purposes of robbery constituted one crime,
not two (murder and robbery). See ULozHENIE o NAKAZANIIAKH UGOLOVNYKH
I IsPRAvlTELNYKH (CODE OF CRIMINAL AND CORRECTIONAL PENALTIES) art.
1453, Comment 9 (1913).
,-6 Id. art. 1453(4).
15 Id. art. 1455.
"S8 Id. art. 152.
'I DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 545.
160 Id. at 544-45.
161 See ULOZHENIE, supra note 155, art. 134. It must be pointed out, though,
that Raskolnikov had confessed, but had never repented: whatever remorse he felt
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was extreme poverty which had forced the defendant to commit the
crime:' 62 "[a]ll the strange and peculiar features of the crime were taken
into consideration. There could be no doubt about the prisoner's ill-health
and straitened circumstances before the crime had been committed.'
' 63
In addition, the court m Crime and Punishment clearly believed that
Raskolnikov suffered from some mental ailment. It was not serious
enough to find him insane but sufficient to mitigate his culpability
[T]he conclusion they drew from [the fact that Raskolnikov had never
actually looked into the stolen purse] was that the crime itself could
only have been committed during temporary insanity, or, m other
words, while the accused was suffering from a monomama of murder
and robbery for the sake of murder and robbery without any ulterior
motive or any considerations of personal gain. That fitted in very nicely
with the latest fashionable theory of temporary insanity 164
Another important factor m the judge's handing down the reduced
sentence was his lack of knowledge about the premeditated nature of the
murder and Raskolnikov's motives. Article 129 of the Russian Penal
Code increased the defendant's culpability based upon the length and
rationality of defendant's premeditation, his education, and the immorality
of his motive. 6 Had the court taken into account the ideological
background of the crime, the sentence should have been closer to the
terms contained in articles 1453 and 1455.
The lenient sentence in the novel, though, is not accidental. For
Dostoevsky, the real punishment of Raskolnikov is not penal servitude,
and the light sentence he received underscores this. Rather, Raskolnikov's
punishment is the crime itself: he has "crossed the line" and has put
himself outside of the moral community of people. In an ironic twist
Raskolnikov ultimately succeeds m differentiating himself from "ordi-
nary" people, but the end result is very unlike what he had imagined it
to be - he is condemned to isolation and solitude. The "external"
sentence imposed by the court is almost irrelevant to Dostoevsky in
comparison with what happens inside Raskolnikov's mind and soul.'66
had to do with him "failing the test" and not with the fact that he killed two
human beings. See also supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
162 See id.
163 DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 545 (emphasis added).
164 Id. at 544.
165 See ULOZHENIE, supra note 155, art. 129.
'66 Unfortunately, the effect of the novel is diluted by a "happy ending"
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B. Raskolnikov's Sentence Under the Model Penal Code
The Model Penal Code's treatment of Raskolnikov's case has many
points in common with Dostoevsky's, but their attitude to pumshment is
not the same. The difference between them reflects the centuries-old
discussion of what is more important: the act itself, or the intent behind
it.'67 The Model Penal Code is a theory of law - it looks to the fact of
crime, punishes it, and tries to deter it; Dostoevsky's is a moral theory -
it condemns the very readiness to "step over the blood" and points to the
moral and spiritual consequences of the crime as the worst punishment
for the perpetrator. Since the Model Penal Code does not consider these
consequences (except insofar as remorse is accepted as a mitigating
factor), the sentencing of Raskolnikov under the Model Penal Code is
likely to be more severe than the punishment meted out to him by the
court in the novel.
To start with, Raskolnikov would be found guilty of several crimes,
not one as under the Russian Penal Code. Being convicted of felonies of
the first degree, he would face not only imprisonment for a mimmum
term of one to ten years and a maximum term of life,6 ' but a possibili-
ty of the death sentence as well. 169 There is little likelihood, however,
that the court would impose a death sentence. It would probably take into
account mitigating circumstances, 70 such as lack of any history of prior
criminal activity; 7' defendant's guilty plea to murder as felony of the
first degree, consented to by prosecuting attorney and approved by the
court; and finally, the consideration that "the defendant's physical or
mental condition calls for lemency ",' On the other hand, at least some
of the aggravating circumstances, listed in section 210.6(3),"74 would
epilogue, in wMch Raskolnikov, serving his sentence in Siberia, repented with
the help of Sonya, and returned to righteous ways. Since Raskolnikov's real
punishment has been moral and spiritual, it was effectively ended by the very act
of his repentance.
167 See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of
Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV
1497, 1514-16 (1974).
168 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 11, § 6.06.
169 Id. § 210.6.
170 Id. § 210.6(1)(b).
'7' Id. § 210.6(4)(a).
172 Id. § 210.6(r)(c).
'7 Id. § 210.6(1)(e).
174 See Id. § 210.6(3)(c) ("[a]t the time the murder was committed the
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probably increase the length of the sentence imposed under section7.06. 175
The mitigating circumstances in Raskolnikov's case may be sufficient
to save him from a death penalty; however, they are too weak to grant
Raskolnikov a sentence in the minimum range. Thus, it is virtually certain
that under the Model Penal Code Raskolnikov's sentence would be
harsher than the one in Crime and Punishment, and considering all the
evidence unknown to the judge in the novel, this is not surprising. The
very plot of Crime and Punishment, its psychological composition,
language, and - above all - the presence of the omniscient witness, the
author, reveal certain truths about Raskolnikov which negate the
mitigating circumstances considered by the court in the novel.
Raskolnikov was not trying to save ins family from misery and was
extremely poor largely by choice; 176 his crime was meticulously
planned and motivated certainly not by a simple "monomania of murder
and robbery ,17 7 Even Raskolnikov's confession was a result not of
remorse, but of disappointment. He was disappointed because the murder
did not produce the desired outcome: he did not become a Napoleon.
Having "failed the test" he punished himself by surrendering to the
police.
Essentially, Raskolnikov was an ordinary person who desperately
wanted to be extraordinary, but lacked the necessary talents, energy, or
willpower. He could come up with only one way to increase his own
status: by subduing another person, by reducing someone to an object by
means of murder. These motives do not grant a foundation for lemency
CONCLUSION
The case of Rodion Raskolnikov is a fascinating mix of legal, moral,
and psychological issues. This Essay attempted to provide a legal reading
of this case, exploring the text of the Model Penal Code for possible legal
defendant also committed another murder"), § 210.6(3)(e) ("[t]he murder was
committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of, or an
attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery
"), § 210.6(3)(g) ("[t]he murder was committed for pecuniary gain"), and §
210.6(3)(h) ("[t]he murder was especiallyheinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting
exceptional depravity").
'7Id. § 7.06 (governing multiple sentences; concurrent and consecutive
terms).
176 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
177 DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 544.
[VOL. 85
1996-97] CRIMES AND DEFENSES OF RODION RASKOLNIKOV 953
arguments and loopholes which might- be used in Raskolnikov's defense.
The legal conclusion reached in the Essay is parallel to Dostoevsky's
moral judgment: as he systematically demes moral defenses to
Raskolnikov, so does the Model Penal Code deny to Raskolnikov all
avenues of legal escape.
The text of Crime and Punishment provides evidence of
Raskolnikov's voluntary conduct and culpable state of mind in murdering
and robbing two women, and demes him any plausible defense.
Raskolnikov cannot justify -his acts by the balance of evils or by self-
defense, he cannot invoke the excuse defense of duress, and even his best
bet - defense of insanity - is extremely weak. Raskolnikov's verdict
under the Model Penal Code is clearly "guilty," and the true motives for
his crimes grant little lemency in sentencing.
The clear legal structure of the Model Penal Code allowed a
systematic look at the complex and convoluted system of motivations
embedded in the plot of Crime and Punishment; at the same time, the
psychological and philosophical complexity of the novel put to test the
moral adequacy of the Model Penal Code. By reading the two texts
together, the Essay attempted to show that Crime and Punishment is a
rich source of ideas for those who are interested in the theory of criminal
law Similarly, introducing the values underlying our criminal justice
system into the novel's analysis may cast Dostoevsky's work in a new,
more contrasting light.

